RECIPROCITY BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANS-MAMMINASATA BUS RAPID TRANSIT (BRT) POLICY IN SOUTH SULAWESI by IBRAHIM, MUHAMMAD AKMAL
Special Issue 
Sci.Int.(Lahore),29(1),271-274,2017  ISSN 1013-5316;CODEN: SINTE 8 271 
January-February 
RECIPROCITY BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANS-MAMMINASATA BUS RAPID TRANSIT (BRT) 
POLICY IN SOUTH SULAWESI 
Aslinda
1
, Muhammad Akmal Ibrahim
2 
1 Makassar Public University, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Department of Administrative Science, Makassar, South Sulawesi. 
Aslinda110@yahoo.com 
2 Hasanuddin University,  Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Department of Administrative Science, Makassar, South Sulawesi. 
Muhakibuh 62@gmail.com 
ABSTRACT: Policy on the implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) program has sparked much debate between BRT 
administrators and public transportation administrators. This dispute has hindered the operations of BRT in the Mamminasata 
region from working effectively and efficiently. The aim of this research is to discover the institutionalized reciprocity between 
government and non-government players in BRT policy. This research utilizes qualitative design. In order to explore in depth 
the dimensions of reciprocal relationship relationship between the government and non-government in the implementation of 
BRT transport policy, this research uses case study. Results of this research show that the reciprocal relationship relationship 
developed by government groups with non-governmental groups in BRT-implementation policy differs according to the 
activities, sector, and scope of expertise of each actor involved. In addition, the findings of this research show that actors in 
BRT policy partook in continuous and democratic dialog in determining expenses paid and benefits reaped by both parties to 
the aim of improving the effectiveness of the Trans-Mamminasata BRT program. 
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INTRODUCTION 
City transportation is a primary component of an urban social 
system. The complexity of transportation systems in cities is 
much greater than those in rural areas mainly due to the 
continuous growth of population numbers in urban areas, the 
increasing number of motorized vehicles exceeding road 
capacity, and the behavior of pedestrians that ignore traffic 
rules. In addition, urban communities have greater mobility 
than rural communities. This is mainly a consequence of 
more rapid social, economic, and demographic progress in 
urban areas relative to rural areas, and because most people in 
urban communities consider mobility as a right. [1] 
The density of transport in urban areas has resulted in public 
transport becoming the primary alternative for people to get 
from one place to another within a city, either by public 
transport vehicles or private vehicles that are bound to fixed, 
regular routes. Public transit exists as a public service to 
provide safe, quick, affordable transportation to the general 
public. The fundamental purpose of public transport is a 
means of accessing workplaces, shopping centers, tourist 
attractions, or meet other socio-economic needs.[2]  
City transport brings with it structural issues, along with the 
issues of process and proper value calculation. These issues 
are the reasons behind the complexity of urban transportation. 
These city transportation issues, thus require public policy 
intervention, namely city transport policy. 
The state plays an important role in the implementation of 
city transport. Developing countries in particular cannot rely 
on the private sector to develop and manage transportation in 
cities. Political and economic changes resulting in the 
minimization of the role of the state in reality give rise to 
many problems such as service quality that is inevitably 
linked to the ability to pay for said services and not out of 
respect for the rights of citizens. Companies provide services 
to the public only when there is potential to make profit, and 
the company cannot be held responsible for the fate of 
citizens that can not access public services [3]. The 
responsibility lies with the state through public administration 
[4].  
This implies that the state must maintain a central position in 
the implementation of public services. This requires the state 
must be capable of designing, adopting, and implementing 
sound public policy, including transport policy. What is 
meant by “transport policy” is the choice of purpose and 
when to act -- or not to act -- in response to public concerns.  
A study that positioned the government central to the process 
of implementation and instituionalization of reciprocal 
relationship relationships with institutionalized social actors 
that hold extensive interests in society is the State-Centric 
Model, [5].  Theoretically, the State-Centric model states that 
the state is at the center of policy-making processes, but 
implementation of said policies is executed through 
reciprocal relationship relationships/collaboration with 
government and non-government actors through various 
forms of corporatism and social relationships. [6]. 
Related to the concept introduced above, at the moment the 
Provincial Government of South Sulawesi is facing the 
challenge of effective public transport policy implementation, 
specifically for policies on the implementation of BRT in the 
Mamminasata region. The complexity of public transport in 
the urban region of Mamminasata is linked primarily to the 
population growth levels and high number of motorized 
vehicles. The population in the Mamminasata region 
increased from 2.06-million in 2003 to 2,4-million in 2013 
[7]. However, repairs and improvement of transport 
infrastructure, roads in particular, were not comparable to the 
increase of privately-owned motor vehicles. To improve 
mobility and accessibility of public transport in Maminasata, 
the Indonesian government (Ministry of Transportation) has 
provided 15 Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) units since 2014 with 
another 30 units planned for deployment.  Based on the 
writer‟s observations of the impact of the presence of BRT, in 
Mamminsata BRT is currently facing operational issues 
primarily related to BRT buslane traffic. Currently, BRTs in 
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Mamminsata still share the same roads as other vehicles 
including other public city transport (pete-pete). The writer 
assumes that, theoretically, the challenges of BRT transport 
implementation in Mamminasata can be solved by either the 
Central Government or Local Government through an 
institutionalized reciprocity with non-government parties, the 
entirety of said relationship organized with the interests of the 
public at the forefront. The involvement of local government 
and non-state parties in BRT policies in Makassar begins 
from policy-making to the execution of BRT policy 
implementation in Mamminasa. 
In order to understand and analyze reciprocity formed 
between government dan non-government parties in the 
implementation of BRT transport policies in Mamminasa, 
South Sulawesi. This problem can be formulated in the form 
of the following research question: “Can the government 
form institutionalized reciprocity with non-government actors 
in the policy-making of BRT in Mamminasa, South 
Sulawesi?” The aim of this research is to know what 
institutionalized reciprocity the government has with non-
government actors in BRT policy in the Mamminasa area of 
South Sulawesi. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The concept of reciprocal relationship in governance theory 
refers to the principle of the civic minimum. This principle 
states: “thos citizens who share in the social product have an 
obligation to make a productive contribution back to the 
community in return [8] . 
This emphasis on reciprocal relationship, according to Bruni 
[9], is a praise of heteroginty, that society works when 
different people are able to cooperate in many different ways. 
This can be applied in the context of BRT policy, and 
understood that BRT policy will run when the invested 
parties are able to work together in many different ways. 
Further, Bruni [9] explains: Civil life is essentially a matter of 
reciprocity. Cooperation, friendships, contracts, facts, family, 
and even conflict all have unique relationships with one 
another, yet they all share the common characteristic that they 
are all forms of reciprocal relationship. Civil society works if 
and when different forms of reciprocal relationship are seen 
as co-dependent and not competitive or function as 
substitutes to other forms of reciprocal relationship.   
Kolm and Bruni [9] defines reciprocity as “gift or favour 
motivated by another gift”. The three forms of reciprocity 
are: (A) the reciprocity of the contract or „cautious‟, (b) the 
reciprocity of friendship or „philia‟, and (c) the 
„unconditional‟ reciprocity. Bruni [9] uses the concept of 
civil reciprocity which is a positive relationship that is easily 
translated into cooperation, thus reciprocity and cooperation 
are one in the same. Bruni simplifies reciprocity into two 
forms, these are: „left-side‟ (altruism or gift) and „right-side‟ 
(contract or interests). 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This study used a qualitative design with case study as its 
research method. With the intention of exploring in depth all 
activities for the implementation of BRT transportation 
policy in the Mamminasata region of South Sulawesi that 
involve reciprocity with non-state entities, this research is 
focused on institutionalized reciprocity between the 
government and non-state players based on decision input 
allowed to non-state actors, negotiation and bargaining about 
means of goal completion, and the burden of costs that non-
state actors bear. The location of this research was in the 
urban area of Mamminasata of South Sulawesi. Urban 
Mamminasata covers the District of Maros, the city of 
Makassar, District of Sungguminasa, and Disctrict of Takalar. 
Analysis of data in this study followed the general qualitative 
systematic procedure, namely the interactive model of 
Huberman and Miles [7]. 
 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
Institutionalized reciprocity between the state and non-state 
parties in the implementation of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
policy in Trans-Mamminasata, South Sulawesi involves state 
actors that are divided into Regional Work Units according to 
their nature and function. For example, the Ministry of 
Transportation, Communication and Informatics, specifically 
the Head of the Department of Transportation  are considered 
as an actor/institution that holds an important role in the 
success of the operations of the BRT program. This 
institution is also known for birthing transportation model 
designs that are planned for operation in the city of Makassar, 
such as the Smart Transportation program. However, a 
portion of the community also view this institution as the 
reason behind the ineffectiveness of the BRT program due to 
unpreparedness or indifference, for example not providing 
subsidies for BRT operations costs and infrastructure costs.  
Failure to utilize bureaucratic instruments in determining 
productive contributions to the implementation of BRT Trans 
Mamminasata policy is also evident in the absence of 
coordination between the main institutions in South Sulawesi 
Provincial Government and the Government of Makassar, in 
this case the Department of Transportation, Communication 
and Information. Both of these institutions lack coordination 
in the determining of route stops and in the regulation of 
public transportation vehicles.  
In the policy Mamminasata BRT in Urban Area, the main 
actors involved in the implementation of BRT are grouped 
into two categories: (1) State actors, which include: South 
Sulawesi Governor; Head of the Department of 
Transportation, Communication and Information of South 
Sulawesi; Makassar Mayor; Head of the Department of 
Transportation, Communication and Information Makassar; 
politicians active in the Regional and Central Governments; 
Makassar City Traffic Police. DAMRI (public company) as a 
technical implementation unit of the Ministry of Transport. 
(2) Non-state actors, which include: Civil society, manifested 
in the form of Non-Governmental Organizations and other 
independent institutions. Private sector (entrepreneurs, 
contractors, suppliers, etc.) Research organizations which are 
groups of transportation experts from universities and 
transportation consultants, community leaders, public 
transport organizations and newspaper media. 
Non-state actors appear to have varying degrees of 
involvement in BRT policy-making. This is consistent with 
the theory described by Howlett and Ramesh (1995) that the 
actors involved in cooperation efforts developed by the 
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government in the implementation of city transportation 
policy differs according to its scope of activities and fields of 
expertise. Civil society as manifested in non-government 
agencies such as NGOs and other independent institutions 
generally show very low levels of involvement in the 
management of BRT public transport in the city of Makassar. 
The private sector (transport companies, contractors, 
suppliers, etc.) has an economic and business interest in BRT 
policy. This means that economically they are local 
capitalists that prioritize economic motives in pursuing 
activities. However,the  results of this research showed that 
the private sector was only active for a few periods in the 
implementation of BRT transportation in Makassar. Member 
companies of the Public Transport Organization (Organda) 
and public transport drivers are the segment of the private 
sector that are most involved in the implementation of BRT. 
Other private sector segments only act as executors, while 
regulation and policy monitoring is conducted by the 
Department of Transportation in Makassar or in other words 
self-managed activities.  
At the moment, there is no participation of the private sector 
in management activities outside of providing input to the 
government asking that extra attention is paid to public 
transport workers who have been operating since long before 
the activation of BRT. Public transport drivers should be 
involved as they have been operating since before the 
presence of BRT, so that the presence of Mamminasata BRT 
does not pose a threat to their livelihoods and becomes a 
potential problem in the future. In the implementation of the 
policies of the BRT Mamminasata urban public 
transportation program, public transport drivers need to be 
further involved in the operations of BRT going forward so 
that the aspirations of the public transport drivers might be 
considered and prioritized. 
Research organizations contain groups of experts, 
consultants, and academics specializing in the 
implementation of the common transport policy. They are 
involved in the policy process and actively provide input and 
solutions to the traffic jams and bottlenecks that occur in the 
city of Makassar as a whole. The news media serve as a 
medium for socialization and communication of the 
government program in transport policy as well as influence 
the public opinion. Even though mass media are limited to 
reporting on activities conducted by the central government 
and local government bodies (in this case the Department of 
Transportation, Communication, and Information), it 
nonetheless plays an active role in influencing public opinion. 
In addition to the institutional actors mentioned above, there 
are other actors involved in the process of BRT policy 
implementation and are, in fact, a direct target of these 
policies: the target group. The public serves as the target 
group (beneficiaries). The findings of this study indicate that 
the public, who are the target group of the BRT program, 
consists of users of public transport, specifically those who 
use the BRT daily such as school children, employees, 
traders, housewives and other members that utilize the 
service on a daily basis.  
The author observed that each of these actors worked to sell 
their individual interests as if they were the main actor in 
BRT policy using their own methods. Ideally, all actors and 
institutions in a democratic and sustainable are involved in a 
dialog determining the burden (cost) and the benefits to be 
exchanged by each to maximize the effectives of the BRT 
Trans Mamminasata program. The reality is the government 
is still reliant on bureaucratic hierarchy to assert the 
obligations and the contributions of each level of 
government. Worse yet, the government has yet to initiate a 
democratic dialog to discuss and agree on appropriate 
compensation for public transportation that is relegated to a 
secondary pathway.  
The idea of change in governance theory is referred to the 
principal of civic minimum. This principal states that, every 
citizen who wanted to share in social product have an 
obligation to make a proportional productive contribution and 
relevant towards community [9]. Accentuation in exchange 
according to Bruni (2008), describe about the confession of 
heterogeneity, confessing that society moves when different 
people able to cooperate in many different ways. This thing 
could be implemented in the context of BRT policy, which 
means that BRT policy will be going well when the different 
stakeholders (interest group) are able to cooperate in many 
different ways. 
Positive contributions as the form of exchange in city 
transportation policy with BRT mode in urban area 
Mamminasata cannot be get off from the legislation of land 
transportation. The constitution, which regulate the public 
transportation policy is the Constitution of Republic of 
Indonesia number 22, 2009 about traffic and road 
transportation. This constitution is the revision of constitution 
number 14,1992 about traffic and road transportation, which 
considered to not relevant to the current condition, strategic 
environmental change and the necessary of the enforcement 
of traffic and road transportation regulations. 
In the constitution number 22, 2009 affirmed about the 
principle and objectives of the enforcement of traffic and 
road transportation. Principle of the enforcement consists of: 
transparency, accountability, sustainability, participative, 
benefit, efficiency and effectiveness, balance, comprehensive 
and independent. 
In that constitution (above) reaffirmed about the instrument 
and accountability of traffic and road transportation 
enforcement. The direct service towards society is 
implemented by government, local government, legal entity, 
and/or society. However, the highest responsibility is on the 
state. The responsibility towards traffic and road 
transportation and its development are held by the 
government. Traffic and road transportation development 
consist of planning, regulating, controlling and supervising. 
According to those reaffirmation, the city transportation, 
principally, has economic mission, prosperity, nation 
development and law enforcement. 
In BRT Trans Mamminasata policy, there are productive 
contributions which expected from state actors (government, 
South Sulawesi Province government, local government of 
Makassar City) and nonstate actors. These productive 
contributions is the form of the exchange principle 
(reciprocity) which the implementation of BRT Trans 
Mamminasata policy is expected to be effective. But, the 
Special Issue 
274 ISSN 1013-5316;CODEN: SINTE 8 Sci.Int.(Lahore),29(1),373-374,2017 
January-February 
result of this research showing that the positive contributions 
from each actor is not determined by democratic dialogue as 
predicted by Durkheim [10]. 
The result of this research showing that the central 
government (ministry of transportation) as the main actor still 
depends on the hierarchy or bureaucratic flow/channel to 
deliver the decisions that have been made related to the 
priorities and objectives of BRT policy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The South Sulawesi provincial government has yet to utilize 
institutionalized reciprocity with non-state actors. With 
regard to the BRT procurement program, the government is 
still reliant on hierarchal bureaucracy and formalized 
regulations. The central government (Ministry of 
Transportation) uses legislation to map funding for local 
governments. The government does not utilize 
institutionalized reciprocity at any level. The reciprocity in 
question is a dialog or contract that specifies the contributions 
and also the burden (cost) of all parties concerned. 
Involvement of stakeholders in the implementation of BRT 
program policies is not continuous. Lack of planning and 
involvement of stakeholders and government officers 
associated with BRT has caused the BRT program to be 
ineffective and inefficient. 
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